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Membership in a Social Group:
Salvadoran Refugees and the
1980 Refugee Act
By ANGELA BOTELHO*
Member of the Class of 1985
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to World War II, the United States did not distinguish be-
tween immigrants and refugees1 for purposes of entry restrictions. In
response to the large number of refugees in Europe after World War II,
Congress enacted a series of measures ostensibly geared toward easing
entry restrictions for victims of Nazi persecution. These measures, how-
ever, were actually and rapidly subsumed by Cold War preoccupations.
To remedy perceived deficiencies in earlier refugee admission pro-
grams, the United States enacted the 1980 Refugee Act (1980 Act).' The
1980 Act sought to create a comprehensive, nonsectarian refugee pro-
gram based largely on the humanitarian ideals of the 1967 UN Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees.' Consistent patterns of discrimina-
tion in refugee admissions have continued to emerge, however, since the
passage of the 1980 Act. This is due partly to the persistence of pre-1980
procedural requirements and partly to the enlarged role of the State De-
partment in the adjudication process under the 1980 Act. These discrim-
* The author gratefully acknowledges Lawrence DiCostanzo for his support and gui-
dance throughout this project. Kate Tweedy and the staffof the International Institute of the
East Bay also merit particular mention for generously sharing their rich resource files and
freely offering advice and support.
1. In non-statutory terms, an immigrant is a person seeking resettlement in a country
other than his or her country of origin. A refugee, by way of contrast, is a person fleeing
serious and endemic problems within his or her country of origin. Thus, the term refugee
carries with it a note of urgency or crisis that the term immigrant does not.
2. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212,94 Stat. 102 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et
seq. and 22 U.S.C. § 2601 (1980)) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Act].
3. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan.
31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered Into force Nov. 1,
1968) [hereinafter cited as Protocol]. It was from the Protocol that the 1980 Act adopted its
definition of refugee.
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inatory patterns are clearly demonstrated in the treatment afforded
Salvadoran refugees under the 1980 Act.
After a discussion of the sources and legislative history of the 1980
Act and an analysis of its provisions, this Note will suggest a legal frame-
work for handling refugee claims that will provide more flexible and eq-
uitable admissions procedures than current policies and practices permit.
Specifically, this Note will examine the situation of Salvadoran Refugees
under the 1980 Act and suggest a means within that Act by which a
fairer and more favorable treatment of these claims can be achieved:
namely, through application of a refugee admissions classification al-
ready contained in the 1980 Act but not heretofore applied to refugee
admissions programs. That classification, "Membership in a Social
Group," is contained within the definition of refugee in the 1980 Act.
Through application of this category, implementation of the 1980 Act
would be brought into closer conformity with the United Nations docu-
ments upon which the Act is based.
II. UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE
LAW: BACKGROUND TO THE
1980 REFUGEE ACT
Prior to 1917, few restrictions were placed on entry into the United
States,4 and there were no specific legislative provisions governing the
admission of refugees.5 Rather, refugees and immigrants were not distin-
guished and both applied for entry under the same provisions. Beginning
in 1917, however, successive acts restricted the number and categories of
people admitted into the United States.
The first of these legislative acts, the Immigration Act of 1917 (1917
Act),6 excluded classes of people considered to be undesirable, such as
anarchists, 7 paupers,' and those with communicable diseases.9 A literary
requirement was imposed on all immigrants, except those fleeing reli-
gious persecution."' The Immigration Act of 1924 (1924 Act),11 for the
4. Scanlon, Regulating Refugee Flow: Legal Alternatives and Obligations Under the Ref-
ugee Act of 1980, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 618, 619 (1981). See generally CRS REFUGEE RE-
PORT, infra note 5.
5. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 96TH CONG., IsT SEsS., REVIEW O U.S,
REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMS AND POLICIES I (Comm. Print 1979) (prepared for the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary) [hereinafter cited as CRS REFUGEE REPORT].
6. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 [hereinafter cited as 1917 Act],
7. Id. at 875.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 877.
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first time expressly stated a purpose of limiting immigration.' 2 To carry
out this purpose, the 1924 Act initiated a quota system under which im-
migration was restricted based upon a percentage of the United States
population as of the 1890 census and the applicant's country of origin."
The obvious effect of the quota system was to freeze racial and ethnic
balances at pre-twentieth century levels.
This system remained in effect until after World War H. Shortly
after that war, in response to the large numbers of displaced persons in
Europe, Congress enacted legislation which, for the first time, was specif-
ically directed at refugee admissions. The Displaced Persons Act of 1948
(Displaced Persons Act), 4 provided for the admission of a fixed number
of refugees from Nazi persecution,"5 certain Czechoslovakian refugees,
1 6
and displaced forced-laborers from countries conquered by Germany. 7
The term "displaced persons" was defined according to the Constitution
of the International Refugee Organization."8 Displaced persons were
given immigration priority subject to national origin quotas established
by the 1924 Act. Applicants, however, had to meet a standard for admis-
sion based on persecution because of race, religion, or political opinion.' 9
The Displaced Persons Act also legalized the status of 15,000 European
refugees already living in the United States,20 and permitted them to re-
main in this country. Amendments to the Displaced Persons Act, en-
acted in 1950 and 1951,21 encouraged immigration of non-communist
refugees from Europe and China and modified cut-off dates in the 1948
Act which had precluded ninety percent of the Jewish refugees from Ger-
many, Austria, and Italy from applying for immigrant status.
2
11. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 [hereinafter cited as 1924 Act].
12. I
13. Id at 159.
14. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009 [hereinafter cited as Displaced
Persons Act].
15. Id,
16. Id at 1010.
17. Anker & Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of
1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 13 (1981).
18. Displaced Persons Act, supra note 14, at 1009. See CONSTIUTION OF THE INTERNA-
TmONAL REFUGEE ORGANIZATION, entered into force Aug. 20, 1948, 62 Stat. 3037, T.I.A.S.
No. 1846, 18 U.N.T.S. 3. For a brief discussion of the history of the International Refugee
Organization definition of refugee and its application, see Cox, "'Well.Founded Fear of Being
Persecuted" the Sources and Application of a Criterion of Refugee Status, 10 BROOKLYN J.
INT'L L. 333, 337-52 (1984).
19. Displaced Persons Act, supra note 14, at 1011.
20. I1d
21. Act of June 16, 1950, ch. 262, 64 Stat. 219; Act of June 28, 1951, ch. 167, 657 Stat. 96.
22. Anker & Posner, supra note 17, at 13.
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The Internal Security Act of 1950,23 an anti-Communist piece of
legislation sponsored by the House Committee on Un-American Activi-
ties,24 amended the 1917 Act deportation provisions to enjoin the Attor-
ney General from deporting any alien subject to physical persecution in
his country of origin.25
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (1952 Act)26 revised
the 1917 Act and modified the national quota system of the 1924 Act by
substituting 1920 census figures as the new percentage basis for the quo-
tas.27 The 1952 Act gave the Attorney General discretionary power to
withhold deportation of any alien subject to physical persecution in his
or her country of origin. This replaced the prior mandatory injunction
against such deportations imposed by the Internal Security Act of
1950.28
The Refugee Relief Act of 195329 was enacted after the expiration of
the Displaced Persons Act in December of 1951 and provided for the
admission of 204,000 non-quota refugees over a three and one-half year
period.30 These refugees were not subject to the limitations of the na-
tional origins quota system established in the 1924 Act. The Refugee-
Escapee Act of 195731 amended the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 and extended the admissions period for non-quota refugees from
particular countries without changing the number to be admitted.
32
Non-quota "refugee-escapees" were defined as those who, because of per-
secution or fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, or political
opinion, were fleeing Communist, Communist-dominated, or Middle
Eastern countries.33
The Fair Share Refugee Act of 196034 gave the Attorney General
discretion to admit a "fair share" of refugee-escapees as defined in the
23. Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987.
24. H.R. REP. No. 2980, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3886.
25. 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 24, at 3912.
26. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified in scattered
sections of 50 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as 1952 Act].
27. d at 175.
28. Id. at 214.
29. Refugee Relief Act of 1953, ch. 336, 67 Stat. 400, amended by Migration and Refugee
Assistance Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-510, 76 Stat. 121.
30. Id. at 401.
31. The Refugee-Escapee Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157-1159 (1980)).
32. Id at 643.
33. Id.
34. Fair Share Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 504 [hereinafter cited as Fair
Share Act].
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1957 Act who were outside their countries of origin and under the Man-
date of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 35 A "fair
share" was defined by the Act as twenty-five percent of refugees resettled
in other countries.36
The Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 196237 is a refugee
service allocation bill of limited impact in refugee admissions policy. Its
primary significance is its definition of refugees: those fleeing persecution
based on race, religion, or political opinion, from any country in the
Western Hemisphere.3 This definition expanded the territorial limita-
tions on refugee status beyond the Communist/Middle East regions.
This broader definition is of limited significance, however, as a result of
the 1965 Amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act,39 still in
force today. The 1965 Amendment incorporated provisions from earlier
acts by applying to all refugees the criteria originally limited to those
seeking entry from Communist, Communist-dominated, and Middle
East countries. Thus, as a result, a refugee meeting these criteria could
gain permanent resident status after two years in the United States even
though not legally admitted under individual adjudication.4° The 1965
Amendment also replaced the physical persecution deportation standard
of the 1952 Act and gave the Attorney General the discretionary power
to withhold deportation if an alien was subject to persecution "on ac-
count of race, religion, or political opinion."41 The amendment also re-
pealed the national origins quota system.42
The above legislative background to the 1980 Act reveals a succes-
sion of immigration and refugee laws enacted initially to preserve pre-
and early twentieth century racial and ethnic population patterns. Sub-
sequent concerns for victims of Nazi and fascist persecution, however,
rapidly yielded to Cold War pressures and priorities. By way of contrast,
as seen below, the United Nations instruments concerning refugees are
less limited by ideological constraints.
35. Id See infra text accompanying notes 169-75 for an explanation ofthe UNHCR
mandate refugee designation.
36. Fair Share Act, supra note 34, at 74 Stalt. 504.
37. Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-510, 76 Stat. 121.
38. Id at 122.
39. Immigration Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et
seq. (1976)) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Act].
40. Id at 913. Lawful permanent resident status permits an alien to live and work perma-
nently in the United States. It also permits the alien to eventually apply for United States
citizenship. 1965 Act, supra note 39, §§ 101(a), 301.
41. 1965 Act, supra note 39, at 918.
42. Id at 911.
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III. UNITED NATIONS PROVISIONS FOR THE
TREATMENT OF REFUGEES
A. The 1951 Convention
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Convention)43
was adopted on July 28, 1951, by the United Nations Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons." Arti-
cle 1 of the Convention defined the term "refugee" as a person who:
[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, na-
tionality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion,
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or
who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his for-
mer habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
45
This Convention definition served to establish threshold entry re-
quirements in the immigration statutes of many signatory countries.
46
These entry requirements were in contrast to the ideologically based
1953, 1957, and 1960 refugee laws of the United States.47 The Conven-
tion did, however, give each Contracting State the option of specifically
limiting application of the Convention to persons made refugees as a re-
sult of events in Europe.48 The United States was not a party to the 1951
Convention.
Article 32 of the Convention, relating to deportation, provides that
"[t]he Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their terri-
tory save on grounds of national security or public order."4 9 Article 33
of the Convention further specifies, in relation to deportation, that "[n]o
Contracting State shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would
43. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 19
U.S.T. 6259, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter cited as Convention].
44. Convened under G.A. Res. 429, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 48, U.N. Doc. A/
1775 (1950).
45. Convention, supra note 43, art. l(A)(2).
46. See Plender, Admission of Refugees: Draft Convention on Territorial Asylum, 15 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 45, 47 n.7 (1977) (discussing the following countries' statutes: Denmark: Act
No. 224 of June 7, 1952, Regarding the Admission of Foreigners, § 2; France: Law No, 52-
893 of July 25, 1952, and Presidential Decree No. 54-1055 of October 14, 1954, 1954 D.L. 432;
Germany: Asylum Ordinance, 1953 BGB1 3; Norway: Aliens' Act of June 27, 1956).
47. See supra text accompanying notes 29-36.
48. Convention, supra note 43, art. 1(B)(1).
49. Id. art. 32(1).
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be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of
a particular social group or political opinion.""0
The 1951 Convention is significant to the present discussion for two
reasons. First, by its terms, the 1951 Convention limits the protections
guaranteed by the signatories, including the principle of non-refoulement,
to those who became refugees by virtue of events occurring prior to
1951. 11 Secondly, by its definition of refugee, the 1951 Convention sets
up an individual burden-of-proof requirement for the refugee applicant, a
factor which has been used to undercut the effects of group refugee deter-
minations in subsequent United States decisions. 52
B. The 1967 Protocol
The United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees53
(Protocol) essentially adopted the 1951 Convention definition of refugee.
The Protocol, however, removed the Convention's temporal limitations
by deleting the words "as a result of events occurring before 1 January
1951," and the words "as a result of such events."'" In addition, parties
to the Protocol pledged to apply the Protocol without geographic limita-
tion,55 thus eliminating the option of imposing such restrictions.56 The
Protocol, however, does not guarantee a right of admission into a signa-
tory country; its protections apply only to refugees currently within the
host country's borders.
The United States acceded to the Protocol in November 1968.58
Until the passage of the 1980 Act, however, the Protocol afforded little
relief to those attempting to gain its protections in the United States.
The Attorney General's discretionary power to withhold deportation
under the 1965 Act was deemed to have remained unchanged. 5
50. Id art. 33(1). The French verb refouler is incorporated into the language of Article
33 and refers to the prohibition against returning refugees to areas where they would be subject
to persecution. This prohibition is commonly referred to in its noun form as the "principle of
non-refoulemenL "
51. Id art. 1(A)(2).
52. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
53. Protocol, supra note 3.
54. Id art. 1(2).
55. Id art. 1(3).
56. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. United States courts have held that the
Protocol provisions do not affect aliens illegally within this country. See infra note 59 and
accompanying text.
58. Protocol, supra note 3.
59. Although Coriolan v. INS., 559 F.2d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1977) held that the Attor-
ney General's discretionary power to withhold deportation under section 243(h) of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act of 1952 "must now be measured" in light of the 1967 Protocol in
1985]
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C. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 60
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
headquartered in Geneva, was created by the United Nations General
Assembly in 194961 as the successor to the International Refugee Organi-
zation created in 1946 to deal with the post-war refugee crisis.6 2 Its en-
abling statute63 is recommendatory and does not bind member states,. 4
Thus the UNHCR has moral, but not legal, authority over signatories of
the 1967 Protocol who pledge to cooperate with UNHCR in its supervi-
sory role over the Protocol's implementation.65
The UNHCR's responsibility falls within four broad categories. 6
1. Protection
As defined in Articles 1 and 8 of the UNHCR Statute, all individu-
general and Article 33 in particular, Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1977),
vacated and remanded, 434 U.S. 962 (1977) concluded from legislative testimony that acces-
sion to the 1967 Protocol did not change immigration procedures by which refugee status was
to be determined. See In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310, 314-18 (1973), in which the Board of
Immigration Appeals acknowledged the United States accession to the 1967 Protocol. Never-
theless the Board refused to stay under Articles 32 and 33 the deportation of an illegal alien
unlawfully remaining in the United States, citing legislative testimony to the effect that ratifica-
tion of the Protocol would not substantially affect statutory and procedural aspects of the 1965
Act. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 14, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 8 (1968); S. ExEc. Doc. K, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. at VIII (1968) for testimony by various State Department officials that the
United States could meet its treaty obligations under Articles 32 and 33 within existing section
243(h) regulations. See also Chim Ming v. Marks, 505 F.2d 1170, 1172 (2d Cir. 1974) (per
curiam), cert denied, 421 U.S. 911 (1975) (holding that an illegal alien, although meeting the
Protocol definition of refugee, is not protected from deportation by Article 32); Kan Kam Lin
v. Rinaldi, 361 F. Supp. 177, 183 (D.N.J. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 493 F.2d 1229 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974) (holding that aliens who are not lawfully in the United
States take nothing by terms of the Protocol).
60. Information in this section is largely based on Maynard, Legal Competence of the U.N
High Commissioner for Refugees, 31 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 415 (1982); Interview with Michel
Moussalli, Director of International Protection, United Nations High Commission for Refugees
Headquarters, REFUGEES MAGAZINE, Sept. 1982, at 41 [hereinafter cited as Moussalli
Interview]; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Washington Liaison Office,
Advisory Letter, Jan. 1982 [hereinafter cited as UNHCR Advisory letter].
61. G.A. Res. 319, 4 U.N. GAOR (265th mtg.) at 38, U.N. Doc. A/Res./319 (1949).
62. For additional material on the International Refugee Organization, see Plender, supra
note 46, at 50 n.30 and Cox, supra note 18.
63. Statute of Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A. Res.
428, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 46, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950) [hereinafter cited as
UNHCR Statute].
64. Id. See also Maynard, supra note 60, at 416.
65. Protocol, supra note 3, art. II, para. 1.
66. See Maynard, supra note 60, at 420-22.
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als who fall within the scope of the statute67 are entitled to protection. 68
67. UNHCR Statute, supra note 63, art. 6(A)-(B) defines those individuals who come
within the Statute:
A. (i). Any person who has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of
12 May 1926 and of 30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and
10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the Constitution of the
International Refugee Organization.
(ii) Any person who, as a result of events occurring before I January 1951 and owing
to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to
such fear or for reasons other than personal convenience, is unwilling to avail himself
of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside
the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear or for
reasons other than personal convenience, is unwilling to return to it. Decision as to
eligibility taken by the International Refugee Organization during the period of its
activities shall not prevent the status of refugee being accorded to persons who fulfill
the conditions of the present paragraph. . . . Any other person who is outside the
country of his nationality, or, if he has no nationality, the country of his former
habitual residence, because he has or had well-founded fear of persecution by reason
of his race, religion, nationality or political opinion and is unable or, because of such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the government of the country
of his nationality, or, if he has no nationality, to return to the country of his former
habitual residence.
68. UNHCR Statute, supra note 63, art. I provides:
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, acting under the authority of
the General Assembly, shall assume the function of providing international protec-
tion, under the auspices of the United Nations, to refugees who fall within the scope
of the present Statute and of seeking permanent solutions for the problem of refugees
by assisting governments and, subject to the approval of the governments concerned,
private organizations to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of such refugees, or their
assimilation within new national communities. ....
Article 8 provides:
The High Commissioner shall provide for the protection of refugees falling under the
competence of his Office by:
(a) Promoting the conclusion and ratification of international conventions for
the protection of refugees, supervising their application and promoting amendments
thereto;
(b) Promoting through special agreements with Governments the execution of
any measures calculated to improve the situation of refugees and to reduce the
number requiring protection;
(c) Assisting governmental and private efforts to promote voluntary repatria-
tion or assimilation with new national communities;
(d) Promoting the admission of refugees, not excluding those in the most desti-
tute categories, to the territories of States;
(e) Endeavoring to obtain permission for refugees to transfer their assets and
especially those necessary for their resettlement;
(f) Obtaining from governments information concerning the number and condi-
tions of refugees in their territories and the laws and regulations concerning them;
(g) Keeping in close touch with the governments and inter-governmental orga-
nizations concerned;
(h) Establishing contact in such manner as he may think best with private orga-
nizations dealing with refugee questions;
1985]
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The statutory language of the refugee definition generally follows the
1951 Convention69 and 1967 Protocol 70 but omits the membership in a
social group category. 71 The stated policy of the UNHCR, however, is
that the scope of protection also extends to displaced persons who find
themselves in refugee-like situations.72 Thus, in effect, refugee definitions
other than those imposed by the Statute may also qualify individuals and
groups for UNHCR protection.
2. Assistance
Economic and technical assistance is offered to governments, refu-
gee groups, and individuals falling under the scope of the UNHCR
protection.73
3. Good Offices
This concept is derived from a series of General Assembly Resolu-
tions.74 The UNHCR is invested with a discretionary power to aid those
for whom a formal statutory determination of refugee status is not made,
often for politically sensitive reasons.75 Such "good offices" may apply to
individuals who have achieved prima facie group rather than individual
refugee determination and involve "an examination of the circumstances
(i) Facilitating the co-ordination of the efforts of private organizations con-
cerned with the welfare of refugees.
UNHCR Statute, supra note 63, art. 8.
The legal basis for the UNHCR protective function is found in Article 8(a) of the Statute
read together with paragraph 6 of the Preamble and Article 35 of the 1951 Convention, as well
as Article II of the 1967 Protocol. UNHCR Advisory Letter, supra note 60.
69. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
71. UNHCR Statute, supra note 63, arts. 6(A)(ii), 6(B).
72. UNHCR Advisory Letter, supra note 60, at 4. As an example of those accorded the
scope of its protection function, the Advisory Letter cites the Refugee Convention of the Or-
ganization of African Unity, which provides:
The term "refugee" shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggres-
sion, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in
either part or whole of his country of origin, nationality, is compelled to leave his
place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his coun-
try of origin or nationality.
OAU Refugee Convention, Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, art,
1, para. 2, adopted Sept. 10, 1969, U.N.T.S. 14691 (entered into force June 20, 1974).
73. See generally UNHCR Statute, supra note 63, art. 8.
74. See Moussalli, Director of Protection, United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees, Geneva, Inter Office Memorandum No. 12/80, Branch Office Memorandum No. 13/80,
UN General Assembly Resolutions and the Competence of UNHCR (Feb. 12, 1980).
75. Moussalli interview, supra note 60, at 41.
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which led the group to leave the country of origin."76 The good offices
concept includes a discretionary power to aid groups of people who meet
the prima facie group refugee determination but who may be unable to
meet the definitional criteria enunciated in the Statute, the 1951 Conven-
tion, or the Protocol.77 It is the position of the UNHCR that such
groups are refugees and must receive non-refoulement protection.'8
4. Additional Activities
The UNHCR also has authority over "additional activities" as de-
termined by the General Assembly.79 This provision basically gives the
General Assembly authority to direct activities of the UNHCR.
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the United Nations has
played a critical role in the development of refugee definitions which ex-
tend beyond national and ideological considerations. The United States
pledged itself to adhere to the United Nations refugee definition when it
acceded to the 1967 Protocol. 1 This pledge was strengthened with the
passage of the 1980 Act in which the Protocol definition of refugee was
adopted in its entirety.
IV. THE 1980 REFUGEE ACT
A. Inadequacies of Earlier Measures
There were several problems regarding the admission of refugees
prior to the passage of the 1980 Act.
82
The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act contained no formal
provisions for granting refugee or asylum status. Refugees entered or
were admitted through one of four mechanisms:
(a) Special legislative enactments of the post-war period, such as
the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, the Refugee Act of 1953, the Refu-
gee-Escapee Act of 1957, the Fair Share Law of 1960. As noted above,
76. Id
77. Id at 42. See also Maynard, supra note 60, at 422.
78. UNHCR Advisory Letter, supra note 60.
79. UNHCR Statute, supra note 63, art. 9.
80. G.A. Res. 319, supra note 61.
81. This adherence arguably has the force of law under the United States Constitution,
Article VI, Clause 2. In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310, 313 (1973).
82. See generally Note, Those Who Stand at the Door Assessing Immigration Claims
Based on Fear of Persecution, 18 NEw ENG. L. REv. 395 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Those Who Stand at the Door]; Note, The Right of Asylum under United States Law, 80
COLUM. L. Rv. 1125 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Right of Asylum]; Weiss-Fagan,
Well-Founded Fears and Burdens of Proof in Political Asylum: The Stevic Case, IV REuGEE
REPORTS No. 15 (July 29, 1983), at 1; Anker & Posner, supra note 17.
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these acts contained stringent ideological criteria as well as temporal lim-
itations as to admissibility.
(b) Section 212(d)(5) of the 1952 Act, under which the Attorney
General was given broad discretionary powers to "parole" refugees into
the United States "for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in
the public interest. ' 83 Congress intended that this provision be used on a
case-by-case emergency determination basis,84 but the provision was used
instead to admit large groups of refugees.85 Indeed, section 212(d)(5)
became the standard means of refugee admissions. Thus the section was
criticized as having "the practical effect of giving the Attorney General
more power than Congress in determining limits on the entry of refugees
to this country."86 More than a million people were admitted under the
parole authority of the Attorney General; a look at the breakdown over a
twenty-three year period demonstrates the consistent policy considera-
tions governing executive use of the 212(d)(5) provision.
83. Act of 1952, supra note 26, § 212(d)(5).
84. CRS REFUGEE REPORT, supra note 5.
85. Id. at 15.
86. Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 20
(1979) (statement of Griffin B. Bell, Attorney General of the United States) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings on H.R. 2816]. For a survey of the role of parole authority under pre-1980 legisla-
tion, see Evans, The Political Refugee in United States Immigration Law and Practice, 3 INT'L
LAW. 204 (1968). For an administrative and legislative history of parole authority, see Com-
ment, Refugee-Parolee: The Dilemma of the Indo China Refugee, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 175
(1975); Note, Refugees under United States Immigration Law, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 528
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Refugees under United States Immigration Law]. For criti-
cisms of parole authority as arbitrary, discriminatory, ad hoc, and inefficient, see Mackler,
Fleeing Political Refugee's Final Hurdle-The Immigration and Nationality Act, 5 KY. L,
REV. 9 (1978); Note, Immigration Law and the Refugee: Recommendation to Harmonize the
Statutes with the Treaties, 6 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 129 (1975); Note, Refugees under United
States Immigration Law, supra.
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HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF REFUGEE
PAROLE ACTIONI
87
Year Country Total Number
1956 Orphans, Eastern Europe 925
1957 Refugees, Hungary 38,045
1960-65 Refugee-Escapees, E. Europe 19,734
1962 Chinese Refugees, Hong Kong,
Macao 14,741
1962-79 Refugees, Cuba 692,219
1973-79 Refugees, Soviet Union 35,758
1975-79 Refugees, Indochina 208,200
1975-77 Detainees, Chile 1,310
1975-79 Chilean Refugees, Peru 112
1976-77 Refugees, Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay 343
1978-79 Refugees, Lebanon 1,000 (est.)
1979 Prisoners and Families, Cuba 15,000 (est.)
The summary chart clearly demonstrates that the vast bulk of refugees
admitted under "parole" actions have been from Communist countries,
an indication of the ideological use of the program.
(c) Section 243(h) of the 1952 Act, which was always used as an
individualized form of relief. The section originally provided: "The At-
torney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien within
the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien would
be subject to physical persecution and for such period of time as he
deems to be necessary for such a reason."8 8
The physical persecution standard for withholding deportation,
taken from the 1950 Internal Security Act (under which such withhold-
ing was mandatory), 9 is not defined in the statute or in the legislative
history,90 although case law gives some guidance.91 The standard of per-
secution in section 243(h) was amended in 1965 to read:
87. S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1979); see The Refugee Act of 1980, 10 DEN.
3. INT'L L. & PoL 155, 156 n.11 (1980).
88. 1952 Act, supra note 26, at 214.
89. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
90. Note, The Right of Asylum Under United States Immigration Law, 33 U. FLA. L
REv. 539, 541 (1981) (citing H.R. REP. No. 3112, 81st Cong., 2d Sss. 9, reprinted in 1950
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3886, 3912) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Right ofAsylum
Under United States Immigration Law].
91. See id. at 541 n.17 which sets forth the following INS definition as cited in Diminich
v. Esperdy, 299 F.2d 244, 246 (2d Cir. 1961): "Physical persecution contemplates incarcera-
tion or subjection to corporal punishment, torture, or death based usually on one's race, reli-
gion, or political opinions."
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The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any
alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion
the alien would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion,
or political opinion and for such period of time as he deems to be nec-
essary for such reason.
9 2
Applications under section 243(h) of the 1965 Act are held before an
immigration judge in the context of deportation hearings. The burden is
on the alien to prove eligibility under the statute. The alien is required to
establish the likelihood of persecution under a clear probability stan-
dard,93 a very strict burden of proof. Moreover, until the passage of the
1980 Act, even if the alien met this burden of proof, relief from deporta-
tion remained discretionary.
94
(d) Section 203(a)(7). This "conditional entry" provision, pertain-
ing only to individuals outside the country, granted the Attorney Gen-
eral discretion to admit a limited number (six percent of the total number
of immigrants admitted annually) of aliens fleeing from persecution or
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion from
any Communist-dominated country or area, or from any country within
the general area of the Middle East, or persons uprooted by catastrophic
natural calamity.9" Most refugees admitted under section 203(a)(7) en-
tered not under individual determinations as under section 243(h), but
under the parole programs authorized by section 212(d)(5) described
above.9 6
Prior to the passage of the 1980 Act, refugee admissions thus suf-
fered from the inadequate provisions of earlier measures. Specific refugee
relief measures were limited as to target group and periods of admission.
Parole programs under section 212(d)(5) were discriminatory, highly in-
fluenced by Cold War policies, and ad hoc in nature. Section 243(h)
procedures were discretionary and required the alien to meet a very strict
standard of proof. Conditional entry programs were small and specifi-
92. 1965 Act, supra note 39, § 243(h), 79 Stat. 918.
93. In re Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 564 (1967); Cheng Kai Fu v. INS, 386 F.2d 750 (2d Cir.
1967), cert denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1967); Rosa v. INS, 440 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1971); Lena v.
INS, 379 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1967); Hamad v. INS, 420 F.2d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1969); for a
discussion of the clear probability standard, see infra notes 123-53 and accompanying text.
94. See, eg., United States ex rel. Leong Choy Moon v. Shaughnessy, 218 F.2d 316, 318
(2d Cir. 1954); United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392, 294-95 (2d Cir.
1953). For a general review of deportation procedures under section 243(h), see Note, The
Right of Asylum, supra note 82, at 1127-28. For an analysis of the effect of the 1967 Protocol
on section 243(h) determinations in pre-1980 cases, see Frank, Effect of the 1967 United Na-
tions Protocol on the Status of Refugees in the United States, 11 INT'L LAW. 291 (1977),
95. 1965 Act, supra note 39, § 203(a)(7), 79 Stat. 913.
96. Weiss-Fagan, supra note 82, at 3.
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cally ideologically oriented, as the enabling language attests. After acces-
sion to the Protocol in October of 1967, questions continued to arise as to
whether the United States was meeting its Treaty obligations by imple-
menting these measures. 7 These problems form a background for con-
sideration of legislative intent behind the 1980 Act.
B. The 1980 Act- Legislative Intent98
"In good measure, our country's humanitarian tradition of ex-
tending a welcome to the world's homeless has been accomplished in
spite of, not because of our laws relating to refugees." 99
The congressional intent behind the 1980 Act was to establish a
comprehensive refugee program which would apply to all refugees
equally without the ideological and geographic limitations of earlier
Acts."° Congress also intended to implement the humanitarian ideals
and spirit of the Protocol, 01 giving "statutory meaning to our national
commitment to human rights and humanitarian concerns, not reflected
in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended." 102 Sena-
tor Kennedy, in initiating the draft bill in 1978, cited the "urgent need
for the United States to begin to take the steps necessary to establish a
long range refugee policy-a policy which will treat all refugees fairly
and assist all refugees equally."103 Testimony for the administration by
Ambassador Dick Clark, United States Coordinator for Refugee Affairs,
at a hearing held on the Bill in March 1979, addressed the need for a
permanent and systematic procedure for refugee admission.104 The in-
tent of the drafters was to provide "a more rational, stable, and equitable
federal policy for the admission of refugees to this country and for assist-
97. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
98. For a thorough history of the various steps in the legislative formulation of the 1980
Act, see Anker & Posner, supra note 17.
99. Hearings on H.&? 2816, supra note 86, at 1 (introductory remarks by Congresswoman
Elizabeth Holtzman). Representative Holtzman, Chairwoman of the House Judiciary Sub-
committee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, was one of those who intro-
duced the 1980 Refugee Act into Congress, along with Senator Edward Kennedy, Chairman of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, and Representative Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee. CRS REFUGEE REPORT, supra note 5.
100. CRS REFUGEE REPORT, supra note 5.
101. i1
102. S. REP. No. 96-256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 141 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 256].
103. Letters of Senator Kennedy to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Associate Attorney
General Michael Egan, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Joseph Califano, and the
Chairman of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies' Committee on Migration and Ref-
ugees (September 11, 1978), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nawvs 141, 142-43.
104. Id at 144.
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ance to them within the United States"'1 and to substitute a humanita-
rian definition of refugee for an ideological one.
10 6
C. The 1980 Refugee Act: Key Provisions
The 1980 Act 0 7 amends the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 and the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962.108 As
stated in the Act, its purposes are: "to provide a permanent and system-
atic procedure for the admission to this country of refugees of special
humanitarian concern to the United States, and to provide comprehen-
sive and uniform provisions for the effective resettlement and absorption
of those refugees who are admitted."'0 9
Section 201 provides a new definition of "refugee" based on the 1967
Protocol, which is in turn derived from the 1951 Convention. Section
201 amends section 101(a) of the 1952 Act as follows:
The term "refugee" means... any person who is outside any country
of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no na-
tionality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually
resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. 1
0
This change in definition has two major effects. First, as Congress in-
tended," ' it brings the 1980 Act into full conformity with the UN defini-
tion of refugee."' Second, it broadens the class of people eligible for
protection under the Act by adding two new categories to previous refu-
105. Testimony of former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 6 (1979).
106. Id. at 9-10. See also testimony in CRS REFUGEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 10. Adi:is.
sion of Refugees into the United States: Hearings on H.R. 3056 Before the Subcomm. on Imml-
gration, Citizenship and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977); Hearings on H.R. 2816, supra note 86, at 172.
107. 1980 Act, supra note 2, 94 Stat. 102.
108. Id.
109. Id. § 101(b), 94 Stat. 102.
110. Id. § 201, 94 Stat. 102-03.
111. S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG, & AD.
NEws 141, 144. See also H.R. REP. No. 108, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979); S. REP. No. 590,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980). Similar indications appear throughout the Act's legislative
history. For more citations concerning the intended accord with the UN documents, see Ami-
cus Curiae Brief of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees at 8 n.12, Stevic v.
INS, 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted 460 U.S. 1010 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
UNHCR Amicus Brie]].
112. See supra notes 47, 53 & 54 and accompanying text.
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gee definitions: nationality and social group membership. The implica-
tions of this latter category are explored in the last section of this
Note." 
3
Section 203(f)(3) amends the parole provision language of the 1965
Act to specify that parole admissions by the Attorney General be han-
dled on a case-by-case basis."
14
Section 207 of the 1980 Act establishes for the first time a general
admissions quota for refugees (as distinct from immigrants). This in-
cludes an emergency provision which allows the President, after consul-
tation with Congress, to admit refugees above the designated quota levels
based on "grave humanitarian concerns" or other "national
interest[s].""' 5
Section 208116 sets forth asylum procedures for certain aliens at "the
discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines
that such alien is a refugee" within the meaning of the definition estab-
lished in section 201."1 Such asylum procedures did not form part of
any previous legislation. Asylum is the process by which an alien already
in the United States applies for refugee status.1" 8 Section 208 provides
that the burden of proof be placed on the alien applicant to establish his
or her conformity with the Act's refugee definition.119 Regulations en-
acted pursuant to the Act mandate an advisory opinion from the Depart-
ment of State's Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
(BHRHA) regarding each asylum applicant's claim of persecution, or
well-founded fear of persecution, in his or her country of origin. 20 Asy-
lum can be denied as a matter of discretion even if the applicant meets
113. See infra notes 193-216 and accompanying text.
114. 1980 Act, supra note 2, § 203(0(3), 94 Stat. 108.
115. IM § 207(b)(2), 94 Stat. 103. Between 1980 and 1982, the President was authorized to
admit 50,000 refugees annually. For 1981, 1982, and 1983, refugee authorizations aflter con-
sultation were 217,000, 140,000, and 90,000, respectively. Presidential Determinations No. 80-
28, 82-1 and 83-2, cited in Note, The Endless Debate: Refugee Law and Policy and the 1980
Refugee Act, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 117, 124 n.36 (1983-1984). For a breakdown by area,
revealing a pattern similar to admissions under the pre-1980 parole admissions program (supra
note 87 and accompanying text), see id. at 126 n.44. In fiscal year 1984, the 72,000 ceiling for
refugee admissions under section 207 was allocated as follows: 50,000 for East Asia; 12,000
for the Soviet Union/Eastern Europe; 6,000 for the Near East/South Asia; 3,000 for Africa;
and 1,000 for Latin America/Caribbean. Presidential Determination No. 83-11 (Oct. 7, 1983),
cited in Blum, The Half Open Door: U.: Refugee Law and the Stevic Case, 31 FED. B. NEws
& J. 198, 201 n.16 (1984).
116. 1980 Act, supra note 2, § 208, 94 Stat. 105.
117. Id § 208(a), 94 Stat. 105.
118. Id
119. 8 C.F.R. § 208.5 (1982).
120. Id § 208.7.
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the definition of refugee. 12 1 However, the alien's failure to meet the Act's
refugee definition necessarily results in the denial of asylum.'
22
An alien whose request for asylum is denied under these procedures
can still apply for relief from exclusion or deportation 23 under section
243(h) of the 1965 Immigrations and Nationality Act, as amended by the
1980 Act. Under such circumstances, the BHRHA advisory opinion is
incorporated into the proceeding. 124
Section 243(h) is amended as follows: "The Attorney General shall
not deport or return any alien. . . to a country if the Attorney General
determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such
country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a partic-
ular social group, or political opinion."1 25 This amended version embod-
ies two significant changes. First, the withholding of deportation is no
longer discretionary but mandatory once the requisite conditions are
met; that is, once the Attorney General determines that the alien would
be persecuted in the destination state on account of one of the five enun-
ciated categories creating refugee status. Section 243(h) is thus theoreti-
cally brought into conformity with Article 33 of the 1951 Convention
and 1967 Protocol. 126 It is crucial to note, however, that in the revised
section 243(h), the Attorney General retains the discretion to determine
the likelihood of persecution: a threshold inquiry for creating access to
the section's mandatory protection. Second, by adding the definitional
criteria of nationality and membership in a social group, the section
121. Id. § 208.8(a). Requests for asylum are made to the District Director, an INS official,
with no right of appeal. Id. § 208.8(c). If, however, deportation or exclusion proceedings have
begun, or are initiated as a result of such determination, asylum requests are made to an immi-
gration judge, also an INS official. Id. §§ 208.3(b), 208.9. Appeal from such proceedings may
be made to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), a division of the Department of Justice.
Id. § 242.21. Appeals from final orders of deportation are made to the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1976).
122. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(0(i) (1982).
123. Aliens subject to deportation are those physically present in the United States who
have either been inspected by an immigration officer or have intentionally evaded such inspec-
tion. Aliens subject to exclusion may be present in the United States but are stopped at the
port of entry. Formerly, only deportable aliens were eligible to apply for relief under section
243(h). In re Pierre, 14 I. & N. Dec. 467, 470 (1973). Under the 1980 Act, this distinction is
moot since both classes of aliens may apply for relief under section 243(h). In re Lam, 18 I. &
N. Dec. 15, 17-18 (1981). See generally Note, Those Who Stand at the Door, supra note 82, at
395, 408 n.88; Note, The Right of Asylum Under United States Immigration Law, supra note
90, at 546 nn.48-49.
124. 8 C.F.R. § 208.10 (1982).
125. 1980 Act, supra note 2, §§ 203(e), 203(h)(1), 94 Stat. 107.
126. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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243(h) grounds for withholding deportation are broadened, at least in
theory.
In summary, under the 1980 Act an alien can apply for admission as
a refugee under section 207 of the Act if outside of the country, or as an
asylee under section 208 of the Act if within the country or at the border.
If subject to exclusion or deportation hearings, an alien can apply for a
withholding of deportation under amended section 243(h). This applica-
tion is treated procedurally like a request for asylum.
D. Problems in Application of the 1980 Act
1. The Evidentiary Standard
A major problem in the application of the 1980 Act has been the
retention of a pre-1980 evidentiary standard. As noted above, the alien
has always had the burden of proving a likelihood of individual persecu-
tion. 27 Prior to 1980, the standard of proof required a showing of a
clear probability of persecution supported by convincing evidence.' 28 In
applying this standard, the immigration judge looked first at whether the
applicant had previously suffered any persecution in his country of ori-
gin.'29 The court then looked at prior political activity in the country of
origin. 3 Political activity occurring after the alien entered the United
States was not considered sufficient evidence.' Motivation for fleeing
the country of origin was also considered. 32 Generally, the persecution
had to flow from the government of the alien's country of origin. If the
source of persecution was non-governmental, the applicant had to prove
that the government was unable or unwilling to prevent such non-gov-
ernmental persecution.'33 Under the clear probability standard, the ap-
plicant for section 243(h) relief from deportation faces a dual burden of
proof: (1) that there is a clear probability of persecution upon deporta-
tion; and (2) that persecution would be specifically directed towards the
127. Rosa v. INS, 440 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 1971); Hamad v. INS, 420 F.2d 645, 647
(D.C. Cir. 1969); Cheng Kai Fu v. INS, 386 F.2d 751, 753 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1003 (1968); Lena v. INS, 379 F.2d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 1967); In re Tan, 12 . & N. Dec.
564, 568 (1967).
128. See, eg., Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. at 568.
129. Iad.
130. In re Rodriquez-Palma, 17 L & N. Dec. 465, 469-70 (1980).
131. Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d 155 (3d Cir 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976).
132. Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194, 196, 199 (5th Cir. 1975).
133. See Wildes, Dilemma of the Refugee: His Standard for Relief, 4 CARDOZO L. REv.
353, 361 (1983); Note, Section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 as
Amended by the Refugee Act of 1980: A Prognosis and a Proposal, 13 CORNELL INT'L UJ. 291,
298-300 (1980).
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individual applicant."3 4
In re Dunar,135 concerned a pre-1980 section 243(h) withholding of
deportation hearing before the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
In Dunar it was contended that a "well-founded fear" standard (based on
the Protocol definition of refugee)136 should be substituted for the tradi-
tional requirement of clear probability in section 243(h) hearings. In re-
jecting this argument, the Board of Immigration Appeals specifically
considered the effect of the United States accession to the Protocol, and
reasoned that where Congress had provided that existing administrative
procedures would remain intact, the clear probability standard was
proper."' In Kashani v. INS, 38 another pre-1980 case, the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals considered whether the clear probability standard
had been changed by the "well-founded fear" language of the Protocol
and decided that there was little to distinguish the two standards. 3 9
After 1980, as noted above, aliens could apply for asylum under sec-
tion 208 by meeting the Act's new definition of refugee. To meet this
definition, the alien need only satisfy a "well-founded fear" standard.
This, however, merely renders the applicant eligible for discretionary re-
lief. Once the applicant is found eligible for such relief, the alien can
make a section 243(h) claim."4° Immigration courts continued to apply a
clear probability standard to post-1980 section 243(h) claims. In In re
McMullin,' the immigration court held that Congress did not intend
the Refugee Act to change the application of section 243(h).142 In 1982,
however, a key Second Circuit case, Stevic v. INS, 4 held that the evi-
dentiary standard of section 243(h) had been changed due to the "well-
founded fear" language of the 1980 Act, making the clear probability test
no longer applicable.'" The Second Circuit did not specify what stan-
dard should apply, but rather it left the actual formulation of a new stan-
134. Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. at 568.
135. 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (1973).
136. See supra notes 45, 54 and accompanying text.
137. Dunar, 14 1. & N. Dec. at 319-20. For the view that nothing in the legislative history
indicates Senate approval of a clear probability standard, but instead suggests a desire to con-
form to the Protocol in the application of a standard of proof, see UNHCR Amicus Brief,
supra note 111, at 8.
138. 547 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1977).
139. Id. at 379. See also Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1977).
140. See supra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
141. 17 I. & N. Dec. 542 (1980), rev'd, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.1981).
142. McMullin, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 545.
143. 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2481 (1984).
144. Id. at 405-08.
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dard to the administrative agency.145 In accord with the Stevic court, the
Sixth Circuit in Reyes v. INS 11 called for a new standard based on the
1980 Act.147 In Rejaie v. INS, the Third Circuit, in direct conflict with
the Stevic and Reyes opinions, held that the 1980 Act did not mandate
change in the section 243(h) procedures.148 The conflict has apparently
been resolved by the Supreme Court which reversed the Second Circuit
in Stevic 49 and held that an alien attempting to avoid deportation must
continue to establish a clear probability of persecution in a withholding
of deportation claim under section 243(h) of the 1980 Act.'" The Court
relied in part on the fact that the text of the amended section 243(h)
neither specified the applicable standard nor referred to the section of the
Act containing the refugee definition with its "well-founded fear" lan-
guage.15' Since it could find no legislative intent to alter pre-existing
practices, the Court stated that the clear probability standard continued
to apply in section 243(h) actions 152 once deportation procedures have
been initiated. 53 The Supreme Court decision, however, did not address
the standard of proof requirement in asylum claims initiated under sec-
tion 208.154
2. Discriminatory Application of the 1980 Act
Numerous commentators have pointed to the political, ideological,
racial, and ethnic considerations that continue to dominate INS decisions
despite the passage of the 1980 Act and the intent of its framers.' 5"
Thus, refugees from non-Communist countries, particularly in this hemi-
sphere, have considerable difficulty in establishing asylum claims. 6
145. Id at 409.
146. 693 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1982).
147. Id at 600.
148. Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 1982).
149. Stevic, 104 S. Ct. at 2481.
150. Id at 2492.
151. Id at 2496-98.
152. Id at 2501.
153. Id at 2500-01.
154. The standard of proof in a section 208 action, as compared to a section 243(h) action,
is at issue in Cardozo-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed
(Nov. 5, 1985) (No. 83-7761).
155. See, eg., Scanlon, supra note 4, at 618, 628-29; Note, The Right of Asylum, supra note
82, at 1132-33.
156. See, eg., the series of cases dealing with Haitian refugees: Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d
204 (2d Cir. 1982); Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977); Pierre v. United States, 547
F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 434 U.S. 962 (1977); Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d
194 (5th Cir. 1975); Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. FLa. 1980),
aff'd as modified sub nom Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982).
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Haitian and Cuban refugees arriving at the same time on the same shores
were accorded a dramatic difference in treatment. 5 7 As noted, the
processing of all asylum claims includes a mandatory "advisory" opinion
from the State Department Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs (BHRHA). State Department recommendations are admitted as
adjudicated facts in subsequent deportation proceedings, a practice that
has been criticized at the appellate level 5 ' but not barred. An example
of the ideological bias of these advisory opinions is found in the fact that
all asylum requests from Poland are given automatic substantiation by
State Department advisory opinions, whereas no asylum applicants from
El Salvador were approved by the State Department as of mid-1980. 59
3. Administrative Backlog
The 1980 Act envisioned the admission of 50,000 asylees annu-
ally.160 Over 19,000 asylum claims were pending as of November 30,
1979.161 In 1980, 130,000 Cubans, 11,000 Haitians, 62 and approxi-
mately 15,000 Salvadorans, Ethiopians, Iranians, and Nicaraguans'63 en-
tered the United States as potential asylum seekers. A projected total
figure of 45,000-50,000 asylees per year is estimated.' 6 It is apparent
from these figures that severe bureaucratic and administrative problems
are created by the volume of claims and potential claims. The resulting
administrative backlog can itself be the cause of undue delay and even
denial of basic rights when applicants are involuntarily detained. At
See generally Note, An Analysis of Haitian Requests for PoliticalAsylum After Haitian Refugee
Center v. Civiletti, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1501 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, An Analysis of
Haitian Requests]. For treatment of Ethiopian refugees, see Martin, Non-Refoulement of Ref-
ugees: United States Compliance with International Obligations, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 357, 377-
79 (1983).
157. See, e.g., Note, Refugee Act of 1980 and the "Cuban-Haitian Entrants"-Status Pend-
ing?, 5 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 212 (1981); Note, Political Asylum for the Hattans?, 14
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 155 (1982); Tompkin, Criminal at the Gate: A Case for the Haitian
Refugee, 7 BLACK L.J. 387, 405-07 (1981). See also Note, an Analysis of Haitian Requests,
supra note 156, at 1512-13 n.91.
158. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7 (1982). See, eg., Zamora v. INS, 534 F.2d 1055, 1060 (2d Cir.
1976); Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675, 676-77 (9th Cir. 1977).
159. Interviews conducted with INS officials by Gracie Berg and with State Department
officials by Gilburt Loescher, reported in Scanlon, supra note 4, at 629 nn. 101-02.
160. Act of 1980, supra note 2, § 207(b), 94 Stat. 103.
161. Interview with State Department official by John Scanlon, reported in Scanlon, supra
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least one court has held that such indefinite incarceration is illegal. 165
In summary, the 1980 Act grew out of a background of prior legisla-
tive enactments, ad hoe in nature, which attempted to deal with special
refugee problems arising out of World War II and its aftermath, but
which were almost immediately transformed into instruments of Cold
War policies. The 1980 Act was framed in a spirit of subordinating these
ideological constraints to a more nonpartisan and humanitarian ap-
proach to the ever-growing world-wide refugee problem. This new ap-
proach was symbolized, and theoretically effectuated, by the adoption of
the United Nations definition of refugee as enunciated in the 1951 Con-
vention and the 1967 Protocol. Unfortunately, the 1980 Act has thus far
failed to bring significant change to the actual United States policy to-
ward the admission of refugees, due largely to procedural mechanisms in
the Act which incorporate earlier burden of proof requirements and
which give the Department of State "advisory opinions" undue weight.
An illustration of this failure is the treatment of refugees from El
Salvador.
V. SALVADORAN REFUGEES: DEFINITION OF THE
PROBLEM AND SUGGESTED RESOLUTION
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE 1980 ACT
A. Salvadoran Refugees
The ever increasing number bf human rights violations in El Salva-
dor, stemming largely from activities of government security forces in El
Salvador, has been reported by many reputable sources. 16 6 These reports
165. Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd in Rodriguez-Fer-
nandez v. INS, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
166. See, ag., AMERICAN WATCH COMMITTEE & THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTs IN EL SALVADOR (3d Supp. July 19, 1983).
Tutela Legal, the human rights monitoring office of the Archdiocese of San Salvador,
tabulated 2,527 murders of civilian noncombatants by government security forces and
paramilitary forces allied with them during the first six months of 1983, an increase from the
2,340 such murders recorded by Tutela Legal during the last six months of 1982. In addition,
Tutela Legal tabulated 326 disappearances after violent abductions by the security forces dur-
ing the first six months of 1983, an increase from the 260 such disappearances recorded by
Tutela Legal during the last six months of 1982.
Since those who do not reappear within 15 days after they have been abducted violently
by the security forces must be presumed to have been killed, the figures for murders of civilian
noncombatants and those for disappearances of civilian noncombatants should be combined.
The combined figure for the first six months of 1983 is 2,853, up from the 2,600 during the last
six months of 1982. Id at 5. The Fourth and Fifth Supplements (January 1984 and August
1984) of this same publication continue to document human rights abuses in El Salvador.
See also United Nations Economic and Social Council, Interim Report on lte Situation of
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characteristically testify not only to the ever increasing number of such
violations but also to the almost unbelievable savagery with which they
are carried out. 167 Numerous personal accounts of unbearable intensity
have been documented.
1 68
The position of the United Nations on refugees from El Salvador is
clear: The Legal Advisor to the UNHCR Washington Liaison Office has
stated that "[p]ersons leaving or finding themselves outside that country
[El Salvador] due to the present situation should be considered prima
facie refugees and should, in any event not be obliged to return directly
or indirectly to El Salvador." '169 Prima facie or "mandate"' 170 refugee
determination is used "in cases of sudden, large-scale influx, or where it
was otherwise impractical to determine the status of asylum-seekers indi-
vidually"' 7 1 and is based on "(1) the existence of an objective situation in
the country of origin, i.e. the element of persecution, and (2) a presump-
tion that the subjective element, i.e., fear of persecution, is also
present."'
172
What is the effect of such mandate status determination on an indi-
vidual seeking refuge/asylum under United States law? As indicated
above, the UNHCR has moral, but not legally binding force over signa-
tories of the 1967 Protocol. 17 All signatories to the Protocol, however,
do bind themselves to Article 33 of that instrument, and the UNHCR, as
enunciated above, has indicated that the non-refoulement provisions of
that Article should apply to Salvadoran refugees under its mandate pro-
tection. 174 On the other hand, given that such determinations are not
individually based, and that mandate protection is also extended to those
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in El Salvador Prepared by the Special Representa-
tive of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/36/608 (1981).
167. For a three-page summary source listing of materials describing conditions in El Sal-
vador, see ACLU PUBLIC POLICY REPORT No. 1, SALVADORANS IN THE UNITED STATES,
app. 1 (Dec. 1983).
168. For first hand accounts, see AMERICANS WATCH COMMITTEE AND AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION, REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR (Jan. 1982 & Supps. July
1982, Jan. 1983, July 1983).
169. Letter from Kallu Kalumaya, Legal Advisor, UNHCR, Washington Liaison Office
(Oct. 21, 1981).
170. Mandate refugees are those coming under the protection and good offices of the
UNHCR. See supra notes 66-72, 74-88 and accompanying text. See also UNHCR, HAND-
BOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 3-6 (Geneva
1979) [hereinafter cited as UNHCR HANDBOOK].
171. UNHCR Advisory Letter, supra note 60, at 2.
172. Id.
173. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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not meeting the classic refugee definition,'75 the legal effects of such man-
date designation on actual Salvadoran refugee claims in the United States
are questionable at this time.'7 '
An evaluation of the recent history of Salvadorans in the United
States shows that the legal effect of the UNHCR mandate status afforded
Salvadoran refugees is unclear. The UNHCR Mission to Monitor INS
Asylum Processing of Salvador Illegal Entrants reported the following in
its September 1981 summary findings:
1. Large numbers of Salvadorans continue to enter the U.S. illegally
on a regular basis and this was seen to have a direct causal relationship
with the internal strife in El Salvador.
3. Though in theory any Salvadoran illegal entrant may apply for
asylum, there appears to be a systematic practice designed to secure
the return of Salvadorans, irrespective of the merits of their asylum
claims. Hence the overwhelming majority of those returning are doing
so "voluntarily" without apparently being freely advised of their asy-
lum rights.
4. According to INS Headquarters, during Fiscal Year 1981 (Oct.
1980-Sept. 1981) only one Salvadoran was granted asylum in the U.S.
and none had been allowed to stay even temporarily in the country for
humanitarian reasons.
5. This would appear to be the result of a deliberate policy estab-
lished by the U.S. authorities in Washington and not the result of indi-
vidual INS judgment in the field.
1 77
The authors of the report conclude that the failure of the United
States "to grant asylum to any significant number of Salvadorans, cou-
pled with continuing large scale forcible and voluntary return to El Sal-
vador, would appear to represent a negation of its responsibilities
assumed upon its adherence to the Protocol." 78 In other words, as of
the 1981 UNHCR Special Report, the United States is not in compliance
with the UN Protocol by virtue of its treatment of Salvadoran refugees.
A recent study (December 1983) reveals that an estimated 300,000-
500,000 Salvadorans currently reside in the United States; at least half of
175. Moussalli Interview, supra note 60, at 42-43.
176. C. Blum, Staff Attorney, International Institute of the East Bay, Adjunct Professor of
Immigration Law, Boalt Hall, University of California at Berkeley, Unpublished Memoran-
dum on the Role of the UNHCR in Adjudication of Asylum Claims of Salvadorans in the
United States (no date).
177. 128 CONG. Rac. S827-31 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1982) (as read into the record at the
request of Senator Edward M. Kennedy).
178. Id.
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these people have arrived since 1980.179 There have been approximately
25,000 asylum claims during that period from this group.180 In fiscal
year 1982, 2118 Salvadorans were deported back to El Salvador."'1 In
the period from May 1982 to May 1983, 1627 Salvadorans agreed to
"voluntary departure" upon detention, and deportation proceedings were
initiated against approximately 10,000 others. 182  In the first three
months of 1983, 31 Salvadorans were granted asylum while 1426 had
their asylum claims denied. 183 In fiscal year 1984, 328 Salvadoran asy-
lum requests were granted and 13,045 such requests were denied. These
figures show that 2.28% of asylum requests from Salvadoran nationals
were granted in fiscal year 1984, as compared with an average of 30% of
asylum claims granted for all other nationalities.
184
While these figures show a slight increase over the one asylum claim
granted in fiscal year 1981 and the granting of no asylum claims before
mid-1980, 185 they also point to a continued pattern of denial of asylum to
Salvadoran nationals. In addition, the question of whether those who
agreed to voluntary departure were adequately informed of their right to
apply for asylum must be raised.186 While little information is available
on the fate of Salvadorans who are returned to their country, t87 it seems
highly likely that, as in the case of Haitian deportations, 188 a pattern of
persecution might be triggered by illegal departure from the original
country or by application for asylum while in the United States.
B. Suggested Resolution of Salvadoran Refugees Determinations,
Based on the 1980 Refugee Act
As the above figures indicate, it has been almost impossible for
Salvadorans to meet the standards governing the determination of asy-
lum claims initiated under either section 208 of the 1980 Refugee Act or
179. ACLU PUBLIC POLICY REPORT No. 1, supra note 167, at 3-4.
180. Id. at 3.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 4.
183. Id.
184. Figures compiled by ACLU Asylum Project, Washington, D.C. from INS Statistics,
185. See supra notes 159, 177 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. See also Orantes Hernandez v. Smith, 541
F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (both
cases finding that Salvadoran nationals are being coerced into signing voluntary departure
forms and are not being advised of the right to apply for asylum and stay of deportation).
187. ACLU PUBLIC POLICY REPORT No. 1, supra note 167, has documented six cases or
murderous reprisals, including decapitation, against returning Salvadorans, Id. at app. Iii.
188. Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 477-78, 480-82 (S.D. Fla. 1980),
aff'd as modified sub nom Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982).
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requests for the withholding of deportation under section 243(h). Rou-
tinely adverse BHRHA opinions based on foreign policy considerations
as well as the discretionary nature of the relief afforded under section 208
serve to keep the number of favorable determinations for Salvadoran ref-
ugees to a minimum. Stringent burden of proof requirements preclude
the granting of relief to most Salvadorans in section 243(h) proceedings.
For Salvadoran refugees located outside the borders of the United States,
the chance of gaining admission under section 207 is exceedingly slim.
As noted, the number and allocation of such admissions are determined
at the executive level in consultation with Congress. 1 9 Allocations since
the passage of the 1980 Act reflect the persistence of pre-1980 ideological
constraints. 190 In fiscal year 1984, only 1000 out of 72,000 refugee ad-
missions were allocated to all of Central America and the Caribbean. 19 1
That same year, El Salvador had the fifth largest refugee population in
the world. 192
To date, Salvadoran applications for asylum have fallen into the cat-
egory of political asylum requests. These requests are routinely being
denied under the procedures outlined above. It is the suggestion of this
Note that a more favorable outcome to Salvadoran asylum claims may
emerge from the use, in asylum proceedings, of the "membership in a
particular social group" category, a key part of the statutory definition of
refugee under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol and incorpo-
rated in relevant part in section 208 and section 243(h) of the 1980
Act.193 While largely overlooked by both commentators and the courts,
a membership-in-a-social-group approach to section 243(h) hearings,
although posing new legal problems, could serve to mitigate the strict
burden of proof requirements currently imposed by the Stevic decision.1 94
The term "membership in a particular social group" was included in
the original 1951 Convention definition as a result of an amendment to
the original Draft Convention definition in Article l(A)(2). 19 The Swed-
ish delegate who introduced the definitional phrase argued that "experi-
ence has shown that certain refugees have been persecuted because they
belong to particular social groups" and that a provision to cover these




193. See Helton, Persecution on Account of Membership in a Social Group as a Basis for
Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. R's. L. REv. 39 (1983).
194. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
195. G.A. Res. 429, supra note 44.
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groups should accordingly be included.1 96 The Amendment was unani-
mously adopted without definition or further comment on July 20,
1951.197
At least one writer contends that the term was intended to cover
those who were persecuted for their social origins, with an eye to those
who were believed to be so persecuted in Eastern Europe. 198 However,
international commentators have emphasized a more expansive use of
the term. Professor A. Grahl-Madsen, an international authority on asy-
lum matters, suggests a "liberal interpretation" of the clause, stating that
"[w]henever a person is likely to suffer because of his background, he
should get the benefit of the present provision."1 99 As applied in interna-
tional law, the concept has been broadly construed, originally in the con-
text of the supposedly anti-Communist intent of the framer of the
term.2" The UNHCR Handbook on Procedure and Criteria for Deter.
mining Refugee Status (Handbook) was published in 1979 to aid govern-
ment officials, lawyers, groups, and individuals in making refugee
determinations 0 1 and has been used since its publication by the Board of
Immigration Appeals as authority in certain cases.202 The Handbook de-
votes three paragraphs to defining the phrase:
77. A 'particular social group' normally comprises persons of similar
background, habits or social status. A claim to fear of persecution
under this heading may frequently overlap with a claim to fear of per-
secution on other grounds, i.e. race, religion, or nationality.
78. Membership in such a particular social group may be at the root
of persecution because there is no confidence in the group's loyalty to
the Government, or because the political outlook, antecedents, or eco-
196. U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 2/1 (1951); U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 2/SR. 3 at 19 (1951).
197. U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 2/SR. 29 at 5 (1951).
198. Plender, supra note 62, at 52.
199. A. GRAHL-MADSON, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 220
(Leyden 1966). See also, S. SINHA, ASYLUM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 103 (1971); Weiss,
The Concept of the Refugee in International Law, 87 JOURNAL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
928, 964 (1960); Shimada, The Concept of Political Refugee in International Law, 19 JAPA-
NESE ANN. INT'L L. 24, 33 (1975); Fragomen, The Refugee: A Problem of Definition, 3 CASE
W. REs. J. INT'L L. 43, 48 (1978).
200. See A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 199, at 219-20.
201. UNHCR Advisory Letter, supra note 60, at 1. The Handbook is "meant for the gui-
dance of government officials concerned with the determination of refugee status in various
contracting states." UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 170, Preface.
202. See, e.g., Stevie v. INS, 678 F.2d at 406; In re Rodriguez-Palma, 17 1. & N. Dec, 465,
468 (1980); see also Helton, supra note 193, at 50 n.79 (citing a memorandum from the Offie
of the Legal Counsel to the General Counsel of the INS and urging acceptance of the guide-
lines in the Handbook as an aid to the construction of the Act). See also Refugee Admission
Proposal: Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 15
(1981) (statement of Doris M. Meissner, Acting Commissioner, INS).
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nomic activity of its members, or the very existence of the social group
as such, is held to be an obstacle to the Government's policy.
79. Mere membership in a particular social group will not normally
be enough to substantiate a claim to refugee status. There may, how-
ever, be special circumstances where mere membership can be a suffi-
cient ground to fear persecution.
203
Each of these three paragraphs suggests a particular problem that
will no doubt be the subject of future litigation if membership cases are
brought before the courts. Paragraph 77 discusses how a social group
might be defined. Paragraph 78 suggests how a persecution claim of a
defined social group may be established. Paragraph 79 states that mere
membership in the social group may be sufficient under "special circum-
stances" to establish a persecution claim, while an individualized show-
ing of fear of persecution is generally required.
The membership in a social group category has not previously been
litigated in United States courts, despite its inclusion in the 1980 Refugee
Act and the 1967 Protocol to which the United States adhered in No-
vember 1968. In a recent INS test case, In re Escobar Nieto & Sanchez
Trujillo,204 currently pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals,
the membership in a social group theory is being used as a basis for an
asylum claim.205 Respondents in that case argue that urban working
class Salvadoran males between the ages of eighteen and thirty form a
distinct and legally cognizable group subject to persecution on the basis
of their non-participation in the military and the attendant imputed
political opinion of guerrilla sympathy.206 While the immigration judge
took judicial notice of the violence and terror historically prevalent in
Salvadoran society,20 7 he denied the claim,20" insisting that "[tihe
probability of persecution on account of race, religion, political opinion
or membership in a particular social group must be based on a determi-
nation of the individual's experience, the individual's background, the
individual's activities and the individual's opinions." 2°9 He also summa-
rily questioned whether the social group of urban working class males
203. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 170, paras. 77-79.
204. In re Escobar Nieto & Sanchez Trujillo, File Nos. A24 235 796 and A24 224 793
(B.I.A. 1983).
205. Id, Respondents' Brief in Support of Appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals
from Denial of Request for Asylum and Withholding of Deportation, at 2.
206. I at 36-38.
207. In re Escobar Nieto & Sanchez Trujillo, Decision of Brian Simpson, Immigration
Judge, at 10-17.
208. Id at 43.
209. Id at 40.
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constituted a legally cognizable group.21°
An earlier case, In re Martinez-Romero,1 indirectly considered
membership in a social group in addressing the claim of a Salvadoran
student claiming fear of persecution because students as a class were sub-
ject to persecution in El Salvador. The Bureau of Immigration Appeals
rejected the claim, basing its decision on lack of evidence "that the re-
spondent would be persecuted for her political beliefs or for her former
student classification.
212
Together these two cases raise the three issues presented by the
UNHCR definitional material regarding membership in a social group:
definition of social groups; evidence of group persecution; and individual-
ized burden of proof requirements. This convergence suggests that these
same issues will arise in any case using the membership in a social group
theory to support a refugee claim. The remaining portion of this Note
discusses each of these issues in turn and suggests arguments and proce-
dural reforms that might maximize the possibility that Salvadorans will
be granted refugee status in INS proceedings.
1. How Can a Social Group Be Defined for Purposes
of the Act?
The term "social group" represents a highly elastic concept. A so-
cial group may be analyzed in a statistical, societal, social, or associa-
tional context.21 a A recent study has considered the use of the term
generally in international practice with reference to UN documents,
among signatories to the refugee Convention and Protocol, and in a do-
mestic legal context. 214 No single definition emerges from international
practice.21 5 In the United States, the term "social group" emerges in a
variety of legal contexts216 including equal protection.21 7 Again, no sin-
gle definition of the term emerges.
The purpose of this analysis is not to formulate an all-inclusive defi-
nition of a social group, but to present a paradigm to support the claims
of asylum applicants under the Act. This Note, therefore, suggests the
210. Id. at 30-32.
211. 18 1. & N. Dec. 75 (1981), aff'd. in Martinez-Romero v. INS, 652 F.2d 595 (9th Cir.
1982).
212. Id. at 79.
213. Helton, supra note 193, at 51.
214. See generally id.
215. Id. at 46.
216. Id. at 48-52.
217. Id. at 48.
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use of an occupational classification as one means of establishing a mem-
bership claim under current law.
A social group based on occupational criteria certainly falls within
the parameters of the use of the term in sociological literature.218 Dis-
tinctions based on occupation have had determinative impact since the
inception of immigration restrictions under the 1917 Act.21 9 In addition,
immigration judges have already taken notice of occupationally defined
groups currently at risk in El Salvador because of imputed anti-govern-
ment sentiment or guerrilla sympathies. Groups mentioned include
clergy, teachers, social workers, trade unionist, and students.220 While
defining a social group by occupation does not exhaust the meaning of
the term, such a definition could serve as a practical framework for liti-
gating membership claims and for resolving some important procedural
and legal issues. The advantage of an occupationally-based definition lies
in its limited and clearly delineated contours, and in its susceptibility to
certain evidentiary requirements at the proof stage of asylum
proceedings.
2. How Can a Persecution Claim for an Occupationally Defined
Social Group Be Established?
The Handbook definition contained in paragraph 772 suggests that
imputed anti-government political sentiments and activity may form the
basis of persecution of all members of a group regardless of the beliefs or
activities of any individual member. Analytically, the evidentiary ques-
tion in a membership case becomes not individual experience, back-
ground, activity, or opinion, but rather the group experience of
persecution.
The Stevic case firmly established a clear probability standard of
proof as to the likelihood of persecution in a section 243(h) proceed-
ing." Under the clear probability standard, the applicant for relief faces
a dual burden of proof: that there is a clear probability of persecution
upon deportation; and that the persecution would be specifically directed
toward the individual applicant.3 How this burden would be met by
occupationally defined social groups is discussed below.
218. Id at 51.
219. 1917 Act, supra note 6, 66 Stat. 876-77.
220. Decision of the Immigration Judge, supra note 207, at 21-23. Cf In re Martinez-
Romero, 18 1. & N. Dec. 75 (1981) (claim of fear of persecution based on student classification
rejected).
221. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 149-53 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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Under current procedures, State Department input, purportedly
based on area profiles, and conclusory in form, is generally used in any
attempt to establish the "likelihood of persecution" claim. These reports
should be replaced by a statistically based occupational profile in all
group membership proceedings. These profiles, updated regularly,
would be a matter of public record. They would detail killings, imprison-
ments, disappearances, deprivations of property, jobs, job rights, civil
rights, and present other statistically relevant data concerning occupa-
tional groups claimed to be at risk. At least one author has suggested
that such procedures could be used to formalize a legal presumption
about the general validity of asylum claims lodged by members of a par-
ticular group.224 Furthermore, a non-State Department source could be
used to generate and maintain such data, using input not just from the
State Department, but also from international trade and occupational as-
sociations, national and international human rights organizations, and
other relevant sources. In short, a clear probability of persecution based
on statistical evidence gathered in public records would seem to be highly
probative in a claim based on membership in a social group, particularly
where the social group is delineated by occupation.
3. Is Mere Membership in an Occupationally Defined Social
Group Sufficient to Establish a Persecution Claim, or
Is an Individualized Showing of Persecution
Required?
Under paragraph 78 of the Handbook, mere membership in a social
group is not generally sufficient to establish a refugee claim, absent spe-
cial circumstances.225 Further, the clear probability standard has tradi-
tionally meant that the applicant in a section 243(h) proceeding has to
show an individualized threat of persecution. Both of these requirements
would undergo change in a social group persecution claim based on
occupation.
It is argued that the statistical evidence used to establish a group
persecution claim as outlined above would constitute the special circum-
stances exception to the mere membership prohibition under the
UNHCR definitional standard. Additional support for an occupation-
ally defined membership claim could be provided where a prima facie
group refugee determination has been made by the UNHCR, as is the
224. Scanlon, Report Submitted to Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy
(Sept. 23, 1980), in STAFF REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REF-
UGEE POLICY, app. C, 50, 51 (1980).
225. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
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case for Salvadoran refugees." 6 Such mandate determination could lend
additional weight to a special circumstances exception to the mere mem-
bership prohibition, since such a designation is dependent upon the ob-
jective fact of persecution in the country of origin as well as upon the
subjective fear of the refugee.227
Throughout the history of refugee adjudications in the United
States, there has been a consistent pattern of individualized burden of
proof in persecution claims under section 243(h) of both the 1952 and
1965 Acts and under section 243(h) and section 208 of the 1980 Act.22
Balanced against this pattern is the equally well-established principle of
large scale refugee admissions under the parole programs discussed
229 taabove, programs that Congress sought to curb under the 1980 Act °
but with only limited success, as the Cuban and Haitian refugee crises
demonstrated.
In a section 243(h) proceeding, the applicant must demonstrate a
clear probability of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. It can be
argued that the only category which in itself would seem to require an
individualized form of proof is the political opinion category. Thus, the
courts have generally required proof of prior political activity in political
asylum claims.231 It must be emphasized that the four other categories
are all status categories. Thus religion, nationality, race, and member-
ship in a social group do not, by definition, require specific activity on the
part of the individual who falls into that category. Thus, once the perse-
cution of that race, religion, nationality, or social group has been estab-
lished under a clear probability standard, it can be argued that the
burden of proof is met, since no additional individual activity is required
to bring about the persecution. In the type of membership case at issue
here, once a showing of persecution of the occupational group has been
established in conformity with the clear probability standard, and once
the applicant proves that he or she is in fact a member of that group, it
can be argued under the above analysis that the individual burden of
proof has been met.
Such an approach, while significantly altering certain procedural re-
quirements, would preserve the objective focus of standards of proof
226. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 88-94, 119, 127 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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while resolving some of the problems of discriminatory application which
have plagued the 1980 Act since its inception and which defy the inten-
tion of its drafters. For Salvadoran refugees, such an approach could
permit a more satisfactory adjudication of many asylum claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
The limitations of current refugee admission practices and policies
are apparent. Evidentiary and political constraints have operated to
deny the vast majority of Salvadoran asylum claims. Such a denial has
occurred notwithstanding the fact that El Salvador is a country where
human rights violations are well-documented and where such abuses
have already created a vast refugee population. Unable, in most cases, to
obtain under current law satisfactory resolution of claims in either sec-
tion 208 or section 243(h) proceedings, Salvadorans and others in similar
situations could perhaps use the membership in a social group category
contained in the refugee definition of the 1980 Act. Claimed membership
in a social group raises important legal issues yet to be adjudicated.
However, the use of an occupational classification in social group cases
could create legally cognizable claims capable of meeting stringent bur-
den of proof requirements. It is strongly recommended that independent
sources of statistical evidence bearing on the probability of persecution be
substituted for the current non-statistical State Department recommen-
dations. Other evidentiary requirements relating to individualized
threats of persecution would be altered under a social group theory to
permit a showing that status, rather than prior individual political activ-
ity, was the source of persecution in the country of origin. This expan-
sion of the Act's application would serve both the intent of the drafters of
the UN Protocol and Convention and the documented humanitarian
concerns of the drafters of the 1980 Refugee Act.
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